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Abstract
We will study a population of individuals playing the infinitely
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma under replicator dynamics. The popula-
tion consists of three kinds of individuals using the following reactive
strategies: ALLD (individuals which always defect), ATFT (almost
tit-for-tat: individuals which almost always repeat the opponent’s last
move) and G (generous individuals, which always cooperate when the
opponent cooperated in the last move and have a positive probability
q of cooperating when they are defected). Our aim is studying in a
mathematically rigorous fashion the dynamics of a simplified version
for the computer experiment in [12] involving 100 reactive strategies.
We will see that as the generosity degree of the G individuals varies,
equilibria (rest points) of the dynamics appear or disappear, and the
dynamics changes accordingly. Not only we will prove that the results
of the experiment are true in our simplified version, but we will have
complete control on the existence or non-existence of the equilbria
for the dynamics for all possible values of the parameters, given that
ATFT individuals are close enough to TFT. For most values of the
parameters the dynamics will be completely determined.
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1 Introduction
We know that cooperation either between individuals, or between parts, ex-
ists not only in human societies, but, more in general, in all biological sys-
tems. Cooperating individuals usually have to pay a cost for the benefit of
other individuals. It is then an interesting question to understand how co-
operation can evolve in the light of Darwinian natural selection. Sigmund,
Nowak and collaborators have studied in several contributions the evolution
of cooperation, see e.g. [8] and [9] for some basic information and more
references.
The essence of the problem can be grasped by the famous Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) stated in different forms by [13] and [14]. In mathematical
terms, the PD is characterized by only two strategies, a pay-off matrix
A =
(
R S
T P
)
, (1)
and the pay-off rankings T > R > P > S. Strategy 1 is C (cooperate)
and strategy 2 is D (defect); matrix element aij is the pay-off received by
an individual playing strategy i confronted by an individual playing strategy
j, i, j ∈ {1, 2}. With the above ranking, given the opponent’s strategy,
defection always has a larger pay-off than cooperation. Using the jargon of
game theory [8], in the PD strategy D is a strict Nash equilibrium, whereas
C is not a Nash equilibrium. Rational individuals must choose D in the PD.
A window for cooperation may be opened when individuals can perceive
that pay-off R for mutual cooperation is better than P for mutual defection.
This cannot happen for the simple PD above, because individuals will interact
only once. If individuals are given the opportunity of interacting many times
before they receive their pay-offs, then a reciprocity mechanism can favor
cooperation. But in this case C and D are not the only possible strategies
and we have the problem of selecting among a huge number of strategies
combining C and D.
In the 1970’s [1] studied strategies for the repeated PD. He organized two
tournaments of the repeated PD and in both realizations of the tournament
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the winner strategy was the simplest among all submitted strategies: tit-for-
tat (TFT). TFT is the strategy which repeats the previous movement of its
opponent.
In Evolutionary Game Theory, see [5] and [4], pay-offs are viewed as
biological fitness and strategies in a population having larger pay-offs have
the tendency to increase their frequencies. Suppose we have a population of
individuals playing n strategies s1, . . . , sn and let xi(t) be the fraction of the
population occupied at time t by individuals playing strategy si. Let also ~x
denote the vector (x1, . . . , xn). We define the fitness of strategy si as
fi(~x) = (A~x)i , (2)
the i-th element of a matrix product, where now A is an n×n pay-off matrix.
The mean fitness of the population is then
φ =
n∑
i=1
fi(~x)xi . (3)
Finally, population dynamics is naturally given by a system of ordinary dif-
ferential equations (ODEs) of the form
x˙i = (fi(~x)− φ)xi , (4)
i = 1, 2, . . . , n, which were introduced in [15] and are called replicator dy-
namics equations. It can be shown [3] that the simplex
Sn = {~x ∈ Rn ;xi ≥ 0,
n∑
i=1
xi = 1}
is invariant under the replicator dynamics.
From now on we will consider the infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
(IRPD) i.e. the limiting case w = 1 in the repeated PD, and as admissible
only reactive strategies defined below:
Definition 1 An individual adopting reactive strategy r(p, q) will choose be-
tween C or D at some round based only on his opponent’s choice at the round
before, according to the following stochastic rule: choose C with probability p
if the opponent chose C the round before; choose C with probability q if the
opponent chose D the round before.
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We may think of p ∈ [0, 1] as a loyalty parameter and of q ∈ [0, 1] as a
forgiveness parameter. Some simple strategies are recognized as reactive:
ALLD, individuals which always defect, is denoted as r(0, 0) and TFT is
r(1, 0).
Reactive strategies were defined in [10] and further studied in [7] and [11].
It can be shown [11] that if
|(p− q)(p′ − q′)| < 1 (5)
then the mean pay-off per round for each player may be defined in terms of
the equilibrium distribution of a Markov chain. This mean pay-off per round
defines the deterministic IRPD pay-off E(s, s′) for a player with reactive
strategy s ≡ r(p, q) against a player with reactive strategy s′ ≡ r(p′, q′):
E(s, s′) = G1cc′ + (S − P )c+ (T − P )c′ + P , (6)
where
c =
(p− q)q′ + q
1− (p− q)(p′ − q′) and c
′ =
(p′ − q′)q + q′
1− (p− q)(p′ − q′) (7)
are respectively the equilibrium probabilities that s cooperates with s′ and
vice-versa, and
G1 = (R− T ) + (P − S) (8)
is a parameter which will have great importance in this work.
Notice that, apart other unimportant cases, condition (5) is not satisfied
in the case where s = s′ = r(1, 0), i.e. both players are TFT. This is due to
the fact that the outcome of the game between two TFT individuals must
depend not only on their loyalty and forgiveness, but also on their initial
moves: they will remain forever in the CC state when both play C at the
first move, or in state DD when both play D, or alternate between states CD
and DC in the remaining cases. As a consequence, pay-off R obtained by
a perfect TFT against another perfect TFT if both start cooperating may
become as low as P if arbitrarily small amounts of “noise” are present.
Inspiration for this work was provided by the seminal computer exper-
iment performed in [12]. In that paper authors took 99 reactive strategies
randomly chosen in the square [0, 1] × [0, 1]. To that sample, suggested by
Axelrod’s results, they added by hand strategy r(0.99, 0.01), an almost TFT
(ATFT) strategy. TFT was not selected due to the above mentioned impos-
sibility of defining its pay-off. All 100 strategies were considered as having
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equal fractions at the initial time and then evolution given by replicator dy-
namics (4) was numerically evaluated. Results were illustrated at Fig. 1 in
[12] and are described as follows:
1. Initially, strategies far from r(0, 0) have their frequencies strongly de-
pleted and it seems that the strategy closest to ALLD will extinguish
all the others.
2. After some time the frequency of ATFT starts increasing, and it looks
like it will win the game.
3. After a lot more time the ATFT frequency decreases and a surprising
strategy named generous TFT (GTFT) finally drives all other strate-
gies to extinction. In the experiment of [12], performed with the same
parameter values as Axelrod’s tournaments, i.e. T = 5, R = 3, P = 1,
S = 0, the winner was the strategy closest to r(1, 1
3
).
GTFT seems to have been discovered in [6] and rediscovered exactly in
[12]. Molander defined GTFT as strategy r(1, q) with q close to
qGTFT = min{2R− S − T
R− S ,
R− P
T − P } . (9)
GTFT is what we may call a genuine collaborative strategy, altruistic indeed,
as stated in [6]. GTFT does more than TFT in reciprocating cooperation, it
is also forgiving.
Our objective in writing this paper is to give precise mathematical ar-
guments supporting the results found in [6] and in [12]. Molander’s paper
considers a situation in which there is no dynamics at all, only pairwise
comparison between pay-offs obtained using different strategies in the IRPD.
Moreover strategies considered in his paper are not reactive, but mixed strate-
gies [3]. One important difference instead between this paper and [12] is that,
unable at this time to prove results for numbers of strategies as large as 100,
we simplify their model and consider the IRPD with only the three more
prominent strategies in their experiment. Moreover, our results will be valid
for any suitable choice of the many parameters of the problem, not a fixed
choice, and any initial conditions for the population.
More concretely, we will consider a population of individuals under the
replicator dynamics (4) playing the IRPD (pay-offs calculated by (6) and
(7)) with three reactive strategies:
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• Strategy 1 is an arbitrary ATFT, i.e. strategy r(1 − 1, 2), where 1
and 2 are positive and small enough. Differently of [12], we need not
consider 1 = 2.
• Strategy 2 is ALLD, i.e. r(0, 0).
• Strategy 3, which will be called Generous (G), is r(1, q), with q >
(1 + 2)
1/2, i.e. perfectly loyal individuals and more forgiving than the
considered ATFT.
We will prove the existence of a maximum amount of forgiveness qGTFT and
a region of initial conditions with positive area such that, as in [12], only
strategy 3 will survive after infinite time. But also we will see what happens
for larger values of q and find out that in some cases we may still have some
weaker form of cooperation evolution.
We will now define what we mean by weaker forms of cooperation evo-
lution, so that we may state our results. For the sake of the following
definition, we will suppose that the initial condition to be used in the dy-
namics is random, taken with uniform probability among all possible triples
(x1(0), x2(0), x3(0)) in the simplex S3.
Definition 2 We will say that the population admits
• full evolution of cooperation if there is a positive probability that the
dynamics will lead to extinction of all individuals adopting strategies
ALLD and ATFT.
• partial evolution of cooperation if there is a positive probability that the
dynamics will lead to extinction of all individuals adopting ALLD, but
ATFT and G will remain.
• weak evolution of cooperation if there is a positive probability that the
dynamics will lead to some condition where the G individuals are not
extinct, but will coexist with ATFT and ALLD.
• no evolution of cooperation if the dynamics leads to extinction of the G
individuals with probability 1.
The methods used are exact calculations of the pay-off matrix and anal-
ysis of its entries. Some of the results depend on asymptotic analysis in
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Table 1: The bullets indicate which equilibria are biological at each interval
in the case G1 < 0. The red equilibrium and vertices E1, E2 and E3 are
biological at all intervals. Possible evolution of cooperation types are F (full),
P (partial), W (weak) or N (no). A type followed by a ? means a conjectured
result.
Green Blue Black Diagrams Type
((1 + 2)
1/2, qgreen) • 38R F
(qgreen, qblue) • • 34R P
(qblue, qblack) • 36 P
(qblack, 1] • • 12, 12R, 13 W?
parameters 1 and 2. For each q we will determine all equilibria of the repli-
cator dynamics in S3, study the dynamics at the boundary of S3 and classify
the few compatible phase portraits in the interior of that region, using for
this classification results in [16] and [2]. In most cases only a single phase
portrait of the complete table in [2] is compatible with the existent equilibria
and dynamics at the boundary. In such cases the dynamics will be com-
pletely determined. In some other cases more than one phase portrait in [2]
will be found compatible, but although dynamics is not yet fully determined,
we have some conjectures about it.
The results are summarized in Tables 1, 2 and 3 separated by the possible
signs of G1 defined by (8). In any case we will define thresholds qred, qgreen,
qblue and qblack and one equilibrium for the replicator dynamics with any of
the above colors. For all possible intervals we will state which equilibria are
present in the biological region S3. The red equilibrium will be biological in
all cases, as well as points E1, E2 and E3. The tables also show which are the
compatible phase portrait diagrams according to their numbering in [2], and
the kind of resulting cooperation evolution, if known. A letter R following
the number of a diagram means that the phase portrait is the one in the
diagram, but with all orbits having the reverse orientation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the pay-off
matrix, define the biological region, the red, green and blue lines and all
the equilibria, with some important notations. In Section 3 we prove some
simpler properties of the entries of the pay-off matrix. Section 4 contains the
most important results of this paper, where appearance or disappearance of
the equilibria in the biological region are calculated according to the sign of
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Table 2: The bullets indicate which equilibria are biological at each interval
in the case G1 > 0. The red equilibrium and vertices E1, E2 and E3 are
biological at all intervals. Possible evolution of cooperation types are F (full),
P (partial), W (weak) or N (no). A type followed by a ? means a conjectured
result.
Green Blue Black Diagrams Type
((1 + 2)
1/2, qblack) • 38R F
(qblack, qblue) • • 9R F
(qblue, qgreen) • 15R N
(qgreen, 1] • • 12, 12R, 13 N?
Table 3: The bullets indicate which equilibria are biological at each interval
in the case G1 = 0. The red equilibrium and vertices E1, E2 and E3 are
biological at all intervals. Possible evolution of cooperation types are F (full),
P (partial), W (weak) or N (no). A type followed by a ? means a conjectured
result.
Green Blue Black Diagrams Type
((1 + 2)
1/2, qblack) • 38R F
qblack 45 F
(qblack, 1] • • 12, 12R, 13 W?
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G1 and the interval to which the forgiveness q of the G individuals belongs.
Section 5 relates the biological equilibria with the phase portraits in [2] and
the corresponding types of evolution of cooperation. The paper is closed by
a conclusions section.
2 Pay-off matrix and notations
Let T , R, P and S be the entries of the pay-off matrix for the simple PD, as
in (1). By definition of the simple PD, these parameters obey inequalities
T > R > P > S . (10)
We will also assume the following inequalities as hypotheses for the results
in this paper:
P <
S + T
2
< R . (11)
The upper bound for (S + T )/2 is a natural condition to ensure that alter-
nating between C and D is not as good as a steady C for a pair of players,
and has already appeared in [6] and further works. The lower bound seems
to be a novel condition necessary for some of the proofs. As a consequence
of this novel assumption we will have in Proposition 1 that any amount of
forgiveness in a reactive strategy will result in a pay-off larger than P for
that strategy against itself.
The pay-off matrix for the IRPD among the three strategies ATFT, ALLD
and G may be calculated in a lengthy but straightforward fashion using (6)
and (7). If strategies are numbered as in Section 1, the result is
A =
 F ( 12 ) (1− 2)P + 2S a13(q)(1− 2)P + 2T P (1− q)P + qT
a31(q) (1− q)P + qS R
 , (12)
where
F (ρ) =
Pρ2 + (S + T )ρ+R
(1 + ρ)2
, (13)
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a13(q) = G1
21(1− q)
[q + (1− q)(1 + 2)]2
− 1
q + (1− q)(1 + 2)
2R− S − T + (T −R)(1 + 2)
1− 1 − 2 (14)
+
R(1− 2)− 1S
1− 1 − 2
and
a31(q) = G1
21
1−1−2
[q + (1− q)(1 + 2)]2
− 1
q + (1− q)(1 + 2)
2R− S − T − [1(T − P ) + 2(R− S)]
1− 1 − 2 (15)
+
R(1− 2)− 1T
1− 1 − 2 .
In (14) and (15), G1 is the combination of parameters in (8).
It is known [3] that the simplex Sn is invariant under replicator dynamics
(4) for any number n of strategies. In our case, we will always consider
x3 = 1− x1 − x2, and accordingly call biological region the projection of the
simplex S3 onto the (x1, x2) plane, i.e. the closed triangle B with vertices
E1 ≡ (1, 0), E2 ≡ (0, 1) and E3 ≡ (0, 0). The sides of B will be denoted by
L1, L2 and L3, where Li is the side on which xi = 0.
Let the fitnesses fi be defined by (2) and for i 6= j denote
nij = {(x1, x2) ∈ R2 ; fi(x1, x2, 1− x1 − x2) = fj(x1, x2, 1− x1 − x2)}
the straight lines in which two fitnesses are equal. We will also denote Pijk
the point at which the line nij intercepts the xk = 0 line. Notice that using
their definition above, coordinates for the Pijk can be easily calculated in
terms of the entries in the pay-off matrix (12).
From general arguments, see [3], the equilibria for the replicator dynamics
with three strategies can be:
• Points in which only one strategy is present, i.e. the vertices E1, E2
and E3 of B.
• Points in which one strategy is absent and the other two have the same
fitness, i.e. P123, P132 and P231, whenever they exist.
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• One point in which all three strategies have the same fitness. This is
the intersection of the three lines n12, n13 and n23, whenever it exists,
and will be denoted Q. Notice that if two among these lines cross at a
point, then the third lines must also pass through this point.
Notice that replicator dynamics in everywhere well-defined in R2 and the
above mentioned points are equilibria whether they lie in B or not. The fact
that we are only interested in the dynamics in B motivates the following
definition:
Definition 3 We will say that equilibria P123, P132 and P231 are biological
whenever they lie in B, but not coincide with any of the vertices. We will
say that equilibrium Q is biological whenever it lies in the interior of B.
In the rest of this paper we will study whether each of the above mentioned
equilibria is biological or not. These equilibria will be studied by locating
the intersections of the nij lines with the sides of B and with each other. We
found it simpler for the sake of the upcoming notations to give arbitrary color
codes to each of the straight lines nij and equilibria. Henceforth line n12 will
be referred to as the red line and P123, intersection of the red line with x3 = 0,
red equilibrium. Similarly, n13 and P132 will be called respectively green line
and equilibrium and n23 and P231 will be called blue line and equilibrium.
The coexistence equilibrium Q will be called black equilibrium.
We will always be interested in positive values for 1 and 2, and most
of the results will hold given that these parameters are small enough. We
define then polar coordinates r and θ in the (1, 2) plane, so that
1 = r cos θ and 2 = r sin θ (16)
Throughout this paper, r and θ will always be used with this meaning.
Many times we will use  to refer to vector (1, 2). We define the phrase
“property P holds if  is small enough” as meaning “there exists r0 > 0 such
that property P holds if 0 < r < r0”.
The overwhelming majority of the intermediate and final results in this
paper will hold if  is small enough. From now on, as with (10) and (11), we
will assume as a hypothesis for the rest of this paper that  is small enough.
In the beginning we will be explicit in stating this hypothesis, because we
want the reader to be aware of it, but with time we will be increasingly more
relapse in reminding it.
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In some instances we will also use the notation O(rα) standard in asymp-
totic analysis. For not letting any doubt about it, if f is some function
depending on , we will write f = O(rα) if there exist r0 > 0 and a constant
K independent of r such that |f/rα| < K for 0 < r < r0.
3 Some properties of the entries of the pay-
off matrix
We start by considering the pay-off F ( 1
2
) of strategy ATFT against itself,
with function F being given by (13).
Proposition 1 (i) F (0) = R.
(ii) limx→∞ F (x) = P .
(iii) F is a decreasing function in [0,+∞).
(iv) There exist positive constants K1, K2 such that
K1
r
≤ F (
1
2
)− P
2
≤ K2
r
. (17)
(v) There exist positive constants K3, K4 such that
K3
r
≤ R− F (
1
2
)
1
≤ K4
r
. (18)
Proof The first two items are direct consequences of (13). The third item
follows easily by calculating the derivative of F and using both inequalities
in (11).
Using polar coordinates (16) we get
F ( 1
2
)− P
2
=
1
r
(R− P ) sin θ + (S + T − 2P ) cos θ
(cos θ + sin θ)2
.
By using (10) and (11) the function of θ in the right-hand side is clearly
strictly positive and continuous in the compact [0, pi
2
]. Letting K1 be its
minimum and K2 its maximum, assertion (iv) is proved.
Item (v) can be proved in an analogous way. 
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Items (i), (ii) and (iii) in Proposition 1 prove that the pay-off of an ATFT
against another ATFT may be any number in (P,R) regardless of the small-
ness of .
If q = 0, strategy G becomes TFT. As a consequence of this, see [11],
a13(0) = a31(0) = F (
1
2
) . (19)
Also at q = 1 both formulas for a13 and a31 simplify and we obtain
a13(1) = R + (T −R)1 and a31(1) = R− (R− S)1 . (20)
Other important properties of these same entries are:
Proposition 2 (i) a13(q) > a31(q) ∀q ∈ (0, 1].
(ii) a13(q)− a31(q) is an increasing function in [0, 1].
(iii) If  is small enough, then both a13(q) and a31(q) are increasing functions
in [0, 1].
(iv) a′13(0)
r→0→ ∞ and a′31(0) r→0→ ∞.
(v) a′13(1)
r→0→ 0 and a′31(1) r→0→ 0.
(vi) If  is small enough, a′′13(q) and a
′′
31(q) are both negative in [0, 1].
Proof After some easy manipulations with (14) and (15), we obtain
a13(q)− a31(q) = 1(T − S)q
q + (1− q)(1 + 2) ,
which proves assertion (i). Differentiating the above equation proves (ii).
To prove (iii), we define first an auxiliary variable
x ≡ q + (1− q)(1 + 2) (21)
which leads us to
a′31(q) = 1
2R− S − T − 1(T − P )− 2(R− S)
x2
− 2G1
2
1
x3
. (22)
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Notice then that a′31(q)/1 is a continuous function of , positive at  = 0. As
a consequence, a′31(q) is positive if 1 > 0, provided that  is small enough.
Using (ii) the analog result is obtained for a13(q).
To prove (iv), we substitute q = 0, thus x = 1 + 2, in (22). Using polar
coordinates and (8), we get
a′31(0) =
1
r
(S + T − 2P ) cos2 θ + (2R− S − T ) sin θ
(cos θ + sin θ)3
+ O(1) .
As the function of θ multiplying 1/r is positive, then the result for a′31(0) is
proved. Using again (ii), we prove the same for a′13(0).
The proofs of (v) and (vi) follow similar ideas. 
Although formulas (14) and (15) are complicated, Proposition 2 tells a lot
about these functions. In particular, properties (iv) and (v) show that both
a13 and a31 grow very fast for q close to 0 and then saturate before q = 1.
To close this section, a simple and important
Corollary 1 If  is small enough and α ∈ (F ( 1
2
), R + (T − R)1), then
equation a13(q) = α has a unique root q in interval (0, 1). Analogously, if
β ∈ (F ( 1
2
), R− (R− S)1), then a31(q) = β has a unique root in (0, 1).
4 Locating the equilibria
We start this section by studying the red equilibrium P123, the simplest
among the equilibria in which only two strategies coexist, because its lo-
cation is independent of the variable q, as shown by the following result.
Proposition 3 The red equilibrium P123 is independent of q and always bi-
ological.
Proof Equating fitnesses f1 and f2, given by (2), and writing x2 = 1 − x1,
which is equivalent to x3 = 0, we obtain
x1(P123) =
1
1− T−P
P−S +
1
P−S
F (
1
2
)−P
2
, (23)
which is indeed independent of q. Using (iv) in Proposition 1 we see that the
denominator in the above equation is dominated by a positive term of order
1/r. Thus x1(P123) > 0 and as small as we want if  is small enough. 
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The next result will be important when showing that the black equilib-
rium will become biological for some intervals in q, because it states that the
intercepts of lines n12, n13 and n23 appear always in the same order on L3.
Notice the appearance for the first time of a hypothesis stating that forgive-
ness q of individuals adopting strategy 3 must not be too close to 0. This will
happen in other parts of this section and has the clear meaning that strategy
3 must be more forgiving than strategy 1 for some of the results to be true.
Theorem 1 (Order on L3) If q ∈ [(1 + 2)1/2, 1], then 0 < x1(P123) <
x1(P233) < x1(P133) < 1.
Proof For ease of comparison, we may rewrite all three quantities in the form
x1(Pij3) =
1
1+c˜ij
, where formulas for the c˜ij will be presented. We will show
that 0 < c˜13 < c˜23 < c˜12, from which the claim will be a trivial consequence.
An easy calculation leads to
c˜13 =
a31(q)− F ( 12 )
q(P − S)
and
c˜23 =
a31(q)− P − 2(T − P )
q(P − S)
and c˜12 may be obtained in (23). As a31(q) is increasing and a31(0) = F (
1
2
),
then c˜13 > 0. If the ratio
1
2
is fixed and  is taken small enough, we obtain,
using (ii) and (iii) in Proposition 1, that F ( 1
2
) > P +2(T −P ), thus proving
that c˜13 < c˜23 for small enough  and q > 0.
Using (20) and, again, the fact that a31(q) is increasing, we may see that,
if q > (1 + 2)
1/2,
c˜23 <
R− (R− S)1 − P − 2(T − P )
(1 + 2)1/2(P − S) ,
which increases as r−1/2 when r → 0. On the other hand, by (23) and (iv) in
Proposition 1, we see that c˜12 increases as r
−1. We conclude that c˜23 < c˜12
for small enough . 
We may now define two numbers related to when the green and blue
equilibria become biological:
15
Definition 4 According to Corollary 1,
a13(q) = R
has a unique root in (0, 1). Let qgreen be this root.
Let also
qblue =
R− P
T − P (24)
be the unique root of equation a23 = R.
With these definitions we prove an important general result:
Theorem 2 Let q ∈ (2, 1]. Then:
• The blue line intercepts L1 if and only q ≤ qblue and intercepts L2 if
and only if q ∈ [qblue, 1]. In particular, the blue equilibrium is biological
if and only if q < qblue.
• The green line intercepts L1 if and only q ≤ qgreen and intercepts L2
if and only if q ∈ [qgreen, 1]. In particular, the green equilibrium is
biological if and only if q > qgreen.
Proof After easy calculations we get
x2(P231) =
1
1 + q(P−S)
R−P−q(T−P )
, (25)
x1(P232) =
1
1− a31(q)−P−2(T−P )
R−P−q(T−P )
, (26)
x1(P132) =
1
1 + a31(q)−F (1/2)
a13(q)−R
, (27)
and
x2(P131) =
1
1− (q−2)(P−S)
a13(q)−R
, (28)
all in the form 1/(1+X), which will be in (0, 1) if and only if the corresponding
X is positive. In all four cases the proof that the necessary X is positive if
and only if the respective condition on q is satisfied is trivial. In the cases
related to the green line, we must use item (iii) in Proposition 2. 
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Besides qblue and qgreen we will define a number qred, which will signal the
passage of the red line through the origin. In order to do that, let µ(q) be
defined by
µ(q) = a13(q)− P − q(T − P ) . (29)
In terms of this new function we may easily obtain
x2(P121) =
µ(q)
µ(q) + 2(P − S) (30)
and
x1(P122) =
µ(q)
µ(q)− [F (1/2)− P − 2(T − P )] , (31)
which show that the red line passes through the origin of the (x1, x2) plane
whenever µ has a zero.
The following lemma proves existence and uniqueness of such a zero:
Lemma 1 Function µ defined by (29) has a single critical point q and a
single zero qred in (0, 1) such that qred > q. Furthermore, q is a maximum
point, µ is positive in (0, qred) and negative in (qred, 1].
Proof As µ′(q) = a′13(q)− (T −P ), then (iv) and (v) in Proposition 2 imply
that µ′(0) > 0 and µ′(1) < 0 if  is small enough. Then µ has at least a
critical point q ∈ (0, 1). Item (vi) in the same proposition proves uniqueness
for q and that it must be a maximum point.
As µ(0) = F ( 1
2
) − P > 0, then µ(q) > 0. And as µ(1) = R − T − (T −
R)1 < 0, then µ has a single zero in (0, 1) and this zero is located in (q, 1).
The assertion on the signs of µ follows from the fact µ′(qred) < 0. 
It is now time to start displaying important results in which the sign of
G1 defined in (8) plays an important role. The first thing to notice is that
formula (14) for a13(q) is notably simplified when G1 = 0. Solving equation
a13(q) = R is trivial and we get, for G1 = 0,
qgreen =
2R− S − T
R− S .
If we calculate the difference between this value and qblue we discover the
identity
2R− S − T
R− S − qblue =
G1(T −R)
(R− S)(T − P ) , (32)
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which shows that qgreen and qblue coincide when G1 = 0. As a13(qgreen) = R,
we discover that µ(qgreen) = (qblue−qgreen)(T−P ), from which we can deduce
that qred also coincides with qgreen and qblue when G1 = 0.
If G1 6= 0, although more complicated, equation a13(q) = R leads only
to a second-degree equation in q and a closed formula for qgreen can also be
obtained. If we solve the equation in the auxiliary variable x defined in (21)
and notice that q and x differ by O(r), we prove in general that
qgreen =
2R− S − T
R− S −
G1(T −R)
(R− S)(2R− S − T )1 +O(r
2) , (33)
with the interesting consequence that the exact calculated value of qgreen for
G1 = 0 holds as a good approximation for qgreen even when G1 6= 0.
By using the ideas above we can easily prove
Theorem 3 (i) If G1 = 0, then qgreen = qblue = qred.
(ii) If G1 < 0, then qgreen < qblue < qred.
(iii) If G1 > 0, then qgreen > qblue > qred.
Equation (33) will be useful later to guarantee that qgreen does not tend
to 0 when r → 0. We will also need to prove the same for qred. This is an
easy consequence of the next result.
Proposition 4
qred = qblue +O(r) (34)
Proof Using the definition of µ (29) and (14), we may rewrite µ(q) = 0 as
R(1− 2)− 1S
1− 1 − 2 −
1[2R− S − T + (T −R)(1 + 2) +G11]
1− 1 − 2
1
x
+
G1
2
1
1− 1 − 2
1
x2
= P +
x− 1 − 2
1− 1 − 2 (T − P ) ,
which solution in x will yield qred. If we substitute 1 = 2 = 0 above, the
solution is simply x0 = qblue.
Substituting x0 we may rewrite the above equation as g(x, ) = 0, with
g(x, ) = −1[2R− S − T + (T −R)(1 + 2) +G11]
1− 1 − 2
1
x
+
G1
2
1
x2
+ x0 − x+ 1(T − S) + 2(T −R) .
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As g(x0, 0) = 0 with
∂g
∂x
(x0, 0) = −1 + O(r) 6= 0 for small enough r, the
implicit function theorem proves that in some neighborhood of  = 0 the
root x of g(x, ) = 0 is a differentiable function of . Differentiability implies
that this root is x = x0 + O(r). Noticing that q and x differ by O(r) leads
to (34). 
We will start justifying tables 1 to 3 with the case G1 > 0. Before that,
a couple of technical results still independent of G1.
Lemma 2 Let q0 ∈ (0, 1] be fixed and independent of . Then:
• a31(q0)− F ( 12 ) does not tend to 0 when r → 0.
• If q ∈ [q0, 1], ddqx1(P132) = O(r).
Proof Using variable x, defined in (21), and (15) we may write
a31(q)− F (1
2
) = R− F (1
2
) +
(R− T )1
1− 1 − 2
− 1
1− 1 − 2
2R− S − T − [(T − P )1 + (R− S)2]
x
+
G1
2
1
(1− 1 − 2)x2 .
Remember that if q0 is fixed, x does not tend to 0 when r → 0. This means
that, apart of the term R−F ( 1
2
), the remaining terms in the right-hand side
do tend to 0 when r → 0. On the other hand, (v) in Proposition 1 proves
that R−F ( 1
2
) is positive and does not tend to 0. This proves the first part.
In order to prove the second part, notice that
d
dq
x1(P132) =
a′13(q)
(
a31(q)− F ( 12 )
)
+ (R− a13(q))a′31(q)[
a13(q)−R + a31(q)− F ( 12 )
]2 .
If q ≥ q0, a13(q) − R is O(r). Moreover, by the first part of this Lemma,
a31(q) − F ( 12 ) does not tend to 0 when r → 0. Thus the denominator in
the expression above does not tend to 0 when r → 0. In the numerator
both terms are O(r), as can be seen in (22) and its analog for a13. As a
consequence, the derivative of x1(P132) is O(r). 
Proposition 5 If q ∈ [qred, 1], then
d
dq
(x1(P122)− x1(P132)) > 0 .
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Proof Formulas for x1(P122) and x1(P132) have already been given, see (31)
and (27).
Equation (34) guarantees that qred does not tend to 0 as r → 0. Then,
by Lemma 2, using e.g. q0 = 1/2qblue < qred, we conclude that
d
dq
x1(P132) is
O(r) in [qred, 1].
By an easy calculation, we have
d
dq
x1(P122) =
[(T − P )− a′13(q)][F ( 12 )− P − 2(T − P )]
[F ( 1
2
)− P − 2(T − P )− µ(q)]2 . (35)
It follows that
d
dq
x1(P122) >
(T − P )− a′13(qred)
F ( 1
2
)− P − 2(T − P ) ,
because in [qred, 1] we have µ(q) ≤ 0, a′13(q) < a′13(qred) and F ( 12 ) − P −
2(T − P ) > 0. In this last expression a′13(qred) is O(r) and the denominator
does not tend to 0. So there exists a positive constant C independent of r
such that d
dq
x1(P122) > C.
We conclude that for small enough , d
dq
(x1(P122) − x1(P132)) > 0 for
q ∈ [qred, 1]. 
We can now prove our first result on the black equilibrium:
Proposition 6 If G1 ≥ 0, the black equilibrium is biological for all q ∈
(qred, 1]. If G1 > 0 the conclusion extends also to q = qred.
Proof First of all, if G1 ≥ 0, by Theorem 3 we know that qred ≤ qgreen. For
q = qred we then know that the green line intercepts the sides L3 (Theorem
1) and L2 (Theorem 2) and then we must have x1(P132) ≤ 0 for q = qred. But
x1(P122) = 0 at qred. By Proposition 5 we discover that x1(P122) > x1(P132)
for q ∈ (qred, 1]. Comparing this order with the order on side L3 given by
Theorem 1, we see that the red and green lines must cross at the interior of
B for all q ∈ (qred, 1]. If G1 = 0 we already knew that the red and green
lines crossed exactly at the origin for q = qred. But for G1 > 0, x1(P132) < 0
already at q = qred, and the lines cross in the interior. 
Our task is now to find out when the black equilibrium first becomes
biological and if it ever loses its biological status. We start with a general
result:
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Proposition 7 For any value of G1 and q = (1 + 2)
1/2 we have x2(P121) >
x2(P131) .
Proof The coordinates for the intercepts of the nij lines with x1 = 0 may
all be written as
x2(Pij1) =
1
1 + bij(q)
.
where, after easy calculations, we get
b12(q) =
2(P − S)
µ(q)
and b13(q) =
(q − 2)(P − S)
R− a13(q) . (36)
As a13((1 + 2)
1/2) = R − O(r1/2) and µ((1 + 2)1/2) = R − P − O(r1/2),
then by the above expressions our assertion is true. 
The order just proved between x2(P121) and x2(P131) at q = (1 + 2)
1/2
is reversed at q = qred if G1 > 0. In fact, if G1 > 0 and q = qred, we have
x2(P131) > 0, because qgreen > qred, and x2(P121) = 0. It turns out that the
green and red lines must cross on L1 for at least one q ∈ ((1 + 2)1/2, qred).
We will show that this crossing is indeed unique, defining qblack. If G1 = 0,
we saw that the green and red lines crossed at q = qred. We will also show
that no other crossing will happen if q ∈ ((1 + 2)1/2, qred).
If x2(P121)− x2(P131) were monotonic in ((1 + 2)1/2, qred) the assertions
in the preceding paragraph would be trivial. As this does not happen, we
must work a bit harder, starting with
Proposition 8 Equation
µ(q) = (1 + 2)
1/2 (37)
has a single root q˜ ∈ [0, qred], which is asymptotically given by
q˜ = qblue − (1 + 2)
1/2
T − P +O(r) . (38)
In particular, q˜ does not tend to 0 as r → 0.
Proof Let q be the critical point of µ as in Lemma 1. As µ(0) > (1 + 2)
1/2
if  is small enough, and µ is increasing in [0, q], then equation (37) has no
solution in that interval. On the other hand, as µ is decreasing in (q, qred]
with µ(qred) = 0, then (37) must have one root exactly in (q, qred).
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In order to obtain (38) we rewrite (37) using definition (29) along with
(14) written in terms of variable x defined by (21). Putting 1 = 2 = 0 we
obtain the approximate solution x ≈ qblue, which suggests us to define a new
auxiliary variable y as y = (x − qblue)r−1/2. Substituting x = qblue + r1/2y
in (37) and making several simplifications, we get that (37) is equivalent to
H(r, y) = 0, where
H(r, y) = G1r
3/2 cos2 θ(1− r1/2y − qblue)
− r
1/2 cos θ[2R− S − T − r cos θ(T − P )− r sin θ(R− S)]
qblue + r1/2y
+ r1/2[(T − S) cos θ + (T −R) sin θ)]− (cos θ + sin θ)1/2[1− r(cos θ + sin θ)]
− (T − P )y .
Repeating the argument with the implicit function theorem as in the proof
of Proposition 4 we obtain (38). 
We now prove a monotonicity argument for x2(P121) − x2(P131), but re-
stricted to (q˜, qred):
Proposition 9 If G1 ≥ 0, x2(P121)− x2(P131) is a decreasing function of q
in (q˜, qred).
Proof
d
dq
x2(P131) = −(q − 2)(P − S)a
′
13(q) + (R− a13(q))(P − S)
[R− a13(q) + (q − 2)(P − S)]2
shows that d
dq
x2(P131) is negative and O(r) in (q˜, qred). In order to conclude
that, we are using the fact proved in Proposition 8 that q˜ does not tend to
0 when r → 0, which implies that both R − a13(q) and a′13(q) are O(r) for
q ≥ q˜. The denominator is of course O(1) due to the (q − 2)(P − S) term.
For x2(P121) we have
d
dq
x2(P121) =
2(P − S)µ′(q)
[µ(q) + 2(P − S)]2 =
µ′(q)
2(P − S)
[
1
1 + µ(q)
2(P−S)
]2
.
In (q˜, qred), µ
′(q) = a′13(q)− (T −P ) < −12(T −P ), where we are using again
that a′13(q) is O(r). Also,
1
1 + µ(q)
2(P−S)
>
1
1 + µ(q˜)
2(P−S)
=
sin θ
sin θ + r
−1/2(cos θ+sin θ)1/2
P−S
>
sin θ
r−1/2[sin θ + (cos θ+sin θ)
1/2
P−S ]
≥ K sin θ r1/2 ,
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where K = maxθ∈[0,pi/2]
(
sin θ + (cos θ+sin θ)
1/2
P−S
)
> 0.
Finally, we obtain, for q ∈ (q˜, qred),
d
dq
x2(P121) < −1
2
T − P
P − S K
2 sin2 θ ,
from which it turns out that d
dq
(x2(P121)− x2(P131)) < 0. 
Putting together all known facts, we can now prove
Theorem 4 (Black equilibrium, G1 > 0) If G1 > 0 and q ∈ ((1+2)1/2, 1],
there is a single value qblack ∈ (q˜, qred) such that the red, green and blue lines
cross on the border of B. Moreover, the crossing is on L1.
Proof By the properties of µ proved in Lemma 1, and noticing that
x2(P121) =
1
1 + 2(P−S)
µ(q)
,
it is clear that the minimum of x2(P121) in [0, q˜] is attained at one of the
boundaries of the interval. But as µ(0) = O(1), and µ(q˜) = (1 + 2)
1/2, the
minimum is attained at q˜ and its value is thus 1−O(r1/2).
An easy calculation shows that the derivative of x2(P131) is negative in
[(1 + 2)
1/2, qred). It can be seen also that x2(P131) = 1 − O(1) at q =
(1 + 2)
1/2. Thus the maximum of x2(P131) is less than the minimum of
x2(P121) in [(1 + 2)
1/2, q˜]. This proves that the red and green lines do not
cross on L1 for q ∈ [(1 + 2)1/2, q˜].
On the other hand, they do cross for q somewhere in (q˜, qred) because we
have already seen that at q = qred < qgreen we have x2(P131) > 0 = x2(P121).
We have also just proved that the reverse holds at q = q˜. Uniqueness of this
crossing in (q˜, qred) follows from Proposition 9. Uniqueness in ((1 + 2)
1/2, 1]
is a consequence of Proposition 6. 
Having settled the question of the black equilibrium for G1 > 0, we
remember that the question of whether the other equilibria are biological or
not is already solved in Proposition 3 and Theorem 2. The results of which
equilibria are biological for G1 > 0, all justified, are summarized in Table 2.
The elements for justifying the equilibria results of Table 3 for the case
G1 = 0 were already proved. It remains for us just the task organizing them.
First of all, in the case G1 = 0 we define qblack to be equal to the common
value qblue = qgreen = qred. We then have
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Theorem 5 (Equilibria for G1 = 0) If G1 = 0, besides equilibria at the
vertices of B and the red equilibrium, which are always biological, these are
the biological equilibria at each interval:
• The blue equilibrium is biological if and only q ∈ [0, qblack).
• If q > (1 + 2)1/2, the green and black equilibria are biological if and
only if q ∈ (qblack, 1].
Proof The assertions for the blue and green equilibria were already proved in
Theorem 2. In Theorem 6 we have already proved that the black equilibrium
is biological for q ∈ (qblack, 1]. The only thing remaining to be proved is
that the red, blue and green lines do not cross on the border of B for q ∈
((1 + 2)
1/2, qblack).
In fact, by Proposition 7 and the same argument in the proof of Theorem
4, we show that there is no crossing for q ∈ ((1 + 2)1/2, q˜). No crossing
for q ∈ (q˜, qred) is a consequence of Proposition 9. Finally, for (qred, 1] the
argument is Proposition 6. So the red, green and blue lines only cross at the
origin for q = qblack. 
The arguments necessary for proving validity of the equilibria results of
Table 1 are similar and simpler than the ones used for the other two cases,
so that we will leave them to the reader.
5 The dynamics
Replicator dynamics was studied from the point of view of the theory of Dy-
namical Systems in [16]. Zeeman addressed mainly the robust cases, where
robust means cases in which the dynamics remains unchanged for arbitrarily
small changes of parameters. In particular, Zeeman showed that it was pos-
sible to classify the phase portraits of replicator dynamics by only knowing
about the existence or not of equilibria at each face of the biological sim-
plex, existence or not of an interior equilibrium, and the stability of each
equilibrium. In the case of three strategies, the number of possible phase
portraits was small enough so that each possibility could be shown. Zee-
man’s work was continued in [2], which included also the non-robust cases,
thus obtaining a complete classification of all possible phase portraits for the
replicator dynamics with three strategies. As we will also be interested in
some non-robust cases, in this section we will refer to the classification by
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Bomze. In particular, we will see that, in most of the possible intervals and
values of G1 in Tables 1 to 3, our knowledge up to now can associate a single
diagram in [2] with compatible dynamics. In these cases the dynamics is
then fully determined. In some other cases, indicated in the tables, there
were three compatible diagrams. The enumeration of the diagrams in our
tables is the same as in [2]. The missing information, which led to doubt
in determining the dynamics, is whether the black equilibrium is attractive,
repulsive or neutral. Of course, for fixed values of parameters, it is an easy
numerical task to linearize the dynamics around the black equilibrium, and
by calculating eigenvalues of a 2 × 2 matrix, discover this information. But
we do not have a general argument to show e.g. that the stability of the
black equilibrium is the same for any choice of parameters in the last row of
each of our tables.
Another information necessary for reading our Tables 1 to 3 is that the
letter R in front of the number of a diagram in [2] means that one should
take the corresponding diagram with all arrows reversed. In fact, the reader
should notice that replacing matrix A by −A in equations (4) has only the
effect of reversing the orientation of all orbits.
In order to be able to reproduce the results about the diagrams in our
tables, we must know about the stability of the equilibria on each side of
B whenever they are biological. On each side of B one of the strategies is
absent and we only need to study the one-dimensional replicator dynamics
for two strategies. Results for this case are rather trivial, see e.g. [8, p. 50],
and only depend on the strategies being or not Nash equilibria. The results
enumerated below are simple consequences of pairwise comparisons between
elements of the pay-off matrix (6).
1. In the absence of strategy 3, strategies 1 and 2 are both strict Nash
equilibria. Thus, for the replicator dynamics restricted to side L3, the
red equilibrium is unstable. Moreover, for any q ∈ ((1 + 2)1/2, 1] we
can divide this side in four regions in which the fitness ranking is the
following:
• Between E2 and P123, we have f2 > f1 > f3.
• Between P123 and P233. we have f1 > f2 > f3.
• Between P233 and P133. we have f1 > f3 > f2.
• Between P133 and E1. we have f3 > f1 > f2.
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In particular, in a neighborhood of P123, f3 is the smallest fitness. This
implies that f3 < φ in a neighborhood of P123, with the consequence
that orbits in the interior of B close to P123 must have x˙3 < 0, and
flow towards L3, which makes P123 a saddle point. This property is
particularly important, because in some cases it is what allows us to
discard some diagrams in [2] otherwise compatible.
2. In the absence of strategy 1, we have two possibilities:
• If q < qblue, the blue equilibrium is biological, and as strategies 2
and 3 are both strict Nash equilibria, then the blue equilibrium is
unstable if the dynamics is restricted to the L1 side.
• If q ≥ qblue, the blue equilibrium is not biological, and only strat-
egy 2 is a Nash equilibrium. Then all orbits on L1 must flow into
E2.
3. In the absence of strategy 2, we also have two possibilities:
• If (1+2)1/2 < q ≤ qgreen, then the green equilibrium is not biolog-
ical, and between strategies 1 and 3, only 3 is a Nash equilibrium.
All orbits on L2 must flow into E3.
• If q > qgreen, then the green equilibrium is biological. Because nei-
ther strategy 1, nor strategy 3 are Nash equilibria, then the green
equilibrium is asymptotically stable when dynamics is restricted
to L2.
An example can help clarify how we have obtained the results on the ta-
bles regarding the compatible diagrams and type of evolution of cooperation.
We take as an example the first line in all three tables. We know that for
q > (1 + 2)
1/2, but not too large, regardless of G1 we will have as biological
equilibria only the three vertices, and the red and the blue equilibria. By
the above reasoning, E1 must be a saddle point, whereas E2 and E3 are at-
tractors, the red equilibrium is a saddle with outgoing orbits on L3, and the
blue equilibrium has outgoing orbits on L1. Point Q is not in the biological
region.
Among the diagrams in [2] not a single one is compatible with the above
situation. But if we reverse the orbits, then diagrams 37 and 38 seem com-
patible. The only one which remains compatible when we take into account
that interior orbits close to the red equilibrium must flow towards L3 is 38R.
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Figure 1: Phase portrait and graph of the fractions x1, x2 and x3 as functions
of time for the following parameter values: T = 5, R = 4, P = 2, S = 0,
1 = .05, 2 = .10, q = .40. The initial condition for the graphs is (x1, x2) =
(.18, .76). Observe the full evolution of cooperation.
In Figure 1 we show a plot of some numerically calculated orbits for a choice
of parameters in one of the cases leading to diagram 38R. Notice that all or-
bits below the separatrix joining the blue and red equilibria lead to survival
only of strategy G. This justifies why we have full evolution of cooperation.
For orbits below the separatrix, but very close to the red equilibrium P123
we can see the occurrence of the phenomenon in the experiment of [12]: an
initial population with majority of ALLD, some ATFT and quite a few G
individuals evolves to a population where only the G individuals are present,
after passing through a transient in which the ATFT are almost the entire
population. The phenomenon is illustrated by the graphs of fractions x1, x2
and x3 as functions of time in Figure 1.
As already mentioned, in the cases at the last line of each Table 1 to 3
we could not find a rigorous argument for proving which of diagrams 12, 12R
and 13 is the correct one.
In the case G1 > 0 (Table 2), we already know for interval (qblue, qgreen)
that the only compatible diagram is 15R, in which the black equilibrium is
unstable and, consequently, there is no evolution of cooperation. It is not
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reasonable that increasing q will foster cooperation. In fact, larger values of
q will make the G individuals more susceptible to exploitation by ALLDs.
Thus the natural conjecture is that if G1 > 0 and q ∈ (qgreen, 1] the black
equilibrium will still be unstable and no evolution of cooperation will happen.
If this conjecture is true, then the associated diagram must be 12R. The
conjecture is supported also by numerical calculation of the eigenvalues of
the linearized dynamics around the black equilibrium.
In the G1 < 0 case we know that there is full evolution of cooperation until
q = qgreen and only partial evolution for qgreen < q < qblack, due to the green
equilibrium destabilizing E3. For larger values of q the black equilibrium
appears and we have no knowledge on its stability. Numerical calculation
of eigenvalues suggests that in the case G1 < 0 the black equilibrium is
asymptotically stable and will attract all orbits in a region of positive area,
which means weak evolution of cooperation and that the correct diagram
should be 12.
Finally, in the G1 = 0 case we may expect a situation intermediate be-
tween the other two cases. Numerical calculations suggest that the real part
of the eigenvalues of the linearized dynamics around the black equilibrium
may be 0. Numerically calculated orbits around the black equilibrium seem
to be closed. The correct diagram would be 13, in which the interior equi-
librium is a center, and evolution of cooperation would also be weak.
6 Conclusions
We have proved that the results of the computer experiment in [12] are true
for a simplified version of that experiment in which, instead of 100 reactive
strategies, we only have the three more prominent ones in the experiment:
ATFT, ALLD and G. More precisely, if we define
qGTFT = min{qgreen, qblue} (39)
then for q ∈ ((1 + 2)1/2, qGTFT ) there exists a region C ⊂ B with positive
area such that the orbit of the replicator dynamics for any initial condition
in C will converge to E3, i.e. only the G individuals will survive.
Equation (39) should be thought as the rigorous version of the (9). In
fact, we say that (9) is not precise because [6], neglecting O(r) terms, defined
GTFT as strategy r(1, q) with q close to the value in (9). Our equation (33)
shows in a precise sense that (9) is indeed a good approximation. We also
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proved that (9) is exact if and only if G1 = 0, and that which between qgreen
and qblue is the minimum depends on the sign of G1.
We have also partially understood the population dynamics for values of
q larger than qGTFT . We have seen that in some cases some weaker forms of
cooperation evolution will still hold, but we have also seen that if G1 > 0 and
q ∈ (qblue, qgreen) no evolution of cooperation is possible, because for almost
all initial conditions only ALLD individuals will survive. The same situation
probably holds also for q ≥ qgreen and G1 > 0, but probably it does not hold
for q > qblack and G1 ≤ 0.
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